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The Honorable Justices of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
x 
Clerk. Supremo Court, Utah 
Re: Klein v. 
Case No, 
Klein 
13994 
To the Honorable Justices: 
Mr. Robert D. Klein has this date submitted to me for my 
review his self-written Petition for Rehearing. Said statement 
was prepared by Mr. Klein without the assistance of myself or 
any other member of my office. His statement is solely his own 
and without any correction or suggestion from me. 
I believe the matters set forth in Mr. Klein's petition 
to be of considerable relevance and to warrant your attention 
and review. 
Mr. Klein's petition and statement are submitted by him 
alone and with my consent as his counsel. Should you have any 
questions concerning this matter, I shall be happy to discuss 
them at your convenience. 
Very truly yours, 
HATCH S PLUMB 
OGH/sa 
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Appeal No. 13994 
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myself in this state, I would beg the Court to address itself 
to some questions and aspects of this case that will enable me 
to put the matter to rest psychologically and with a good con-
science, knowing that I made every effort to understand and 
accept what has happened. 
Tn personally making this request for rehearing and/or 
reconsideration, I would like to express my appreciation for 
my attorney and for his efforts in my behalf. 
I wish to be able to accept the Court's judgment, 
and it is for this reason, a kind of npeace of mind11 if you 
will, that I seek a rational explanation of issues that to me 
seem to have been overlooked. 
Upon careful analysis of what has been written in 
the affirmation ruling, I see no tendencies or inclinations that 
suggest the possibility of reconsideration. Nevertheless, in 
view of my belief in myself, and my own conclusions, I must 
speak to the issues as I, being their principle author, know 
them. The affirmative and concurring view seems to say that 
by my stipulation I nconsentedf? to a judgment. Although I dis-
agree with Judge Taylor, his court has executed an order confirm-
ing that I have given my "consent". There is of course a dis-
senting viewpoint. 
In the spirit of that nclose proximity observation", 
does the lower court have any responsibility to listen to the 
timely pleadings of a litigant who makes an effort to explain 
why he believes he cannot legally and/or practically comply with 
a given stipulation? 
-2-
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Consider the following five points: 
(One) The alleged $1,748,809.98 evaluation of the 
marital estate is based upon the additional inclusion and not 
necessarily the reevaluation of properties. The total appraised 
value of these inclusionary properties approximates $1,200,000. 
Three of the additionally included properties were not included 
in the Faux decree. They are: 
(1) Holidair Lands, Inc. [Sandberg property) 
C2) Award Homes, Inc. stock 
(3) The Seegmiller property 
Two of the above-mentioned properties were and are 
not now owned by myself. They are: 
(1) The Sandberg property 
(2) Award Homes stock 
Part of my understanding of the ngoings on" consisted 
of the grasping and understanding of facts like these. Is it 
npropern or correct law for properties that I donTt own to be 
included in the evaluation of a marital estate? Should I or should 
I not advise the court of my stipulating to such an inaccuracy? 
Two of these inaccurate factors of ownership exist today and have 
been confirmed by the appellant court's affirmation. Is the 
Court aware of this? 
The Seegmiller property appears to me to have been 
acquired under circumstances that are deserving of some considera-
tion. When I bought it I thought I was doing so because it was 
awarded to me and that Faux had wanted me to be able to go on 
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and practice my occupation of land developer. Because of this, 
I thought Faux awarded this property to me. The effect of this 
judgment has the opposite result and actually, if included as 
a part of the marital estate, has the effect of punishing me 
for taking the bold action to acquire it. Would the Court please 
address itself to this acquisition. Should it actually have 
been included as a part of the marital estate or not? For what 
reasons? 
(Two) Another "goings on" that I came to comprehend 
within hours after my "so spoken by Robert D. Klein" stipulation 
was that Holidair Lands, Inc., a corporation, with a 17.5% 
minority stockholder owner, had placed upon it a judgment, even 
though it was not a party to a divorce action. As an individual 
I had stipulated to pay approximately $60,000 of Holidair assets 
at the expense of a minority stockholder interest. This to me 
seemed to be in conflict with my fiduciary responsibility as 
President of Holidair Lands. Question: Is this a proper finding? 
Should I or should I not make an effort to point this out to 
the Court? To me I felt I wanted to do so and that I had to do 
so. Granted, that Judge Taylor may not have understood this 
as I pleaded with him to permit me to withdraw my stipulation, 
but I was nevertheless explicit that I could not give my consent 
to such a legitimate legal conflict of interest. This incon-
sistency has not been dispensed with by the Court through its 
present action. Not my then attorney, or the Defendant's attorney, 
or the Court pointed this out to me. I discovered this on my 
own and made an effort to withdraw my consent on my own, in part 
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because of this. I really don't understand how I can stipulate 
to such an inconsistency. No one it seemed would listen to me, 
and now in the present action I am suffering a frustration in 
this particular. This is a real puzzlement for me. I just don't 
understand what to do or how to comply with this aspect of the 
imposed judgment. This aspect of the judgment will in all likeli-
hood precipitate a third party lawsuit. 
[Three) Another inconsistency that seems to me to 
be unenforceable relates to my agreeing to deliver 14 apartments, 
7 of which were not and are not now owned by myself. I have 
actually made the effort to acquire these 7 additional apart-
ments, but even at this time I have not been able to do so 
owing (1) to my mother's control of the Award Homes, Inc. stock, 
and (2) owing to the loyalty of her attorneys, who assisted her 
in preparing the trust that apparently this consent judgment 
disregards. By the terms of the judgment, I find my situation 
to be that I must ask my mother, who has already contributed 
$50,000 from her savings toward the acquisition of the marital 
estate, to ask three trustees to relinquish stock that she had 
put in trust for her grandchildren. I am one of those trustees, 
and the other two are Leo Jardine, who is my mother's attorney, 
as well as my own, and Harvard Hinton, a longstanding friend of 
our family. 
This aspect of the judgment, if insisted upon, will 
in all likelihood produce a third party lawsuit. It illustrates 
further my conundrum and why I made a timely effort to be absolved 
from stipulating thereto. Is it the intent of this Court to 
-5-
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ratify that aspect of the presently imposed judgment? Actually, 
in this connection, while the facts are true, the matter was 
not discussed in the briefs although the record does address 
itself to the issue herein outlined. A third party lawsuit is 
likely to result from this issue if executed in its present form. 
(Four) Another potential third party lawsuit that this 
judgment can and will probably induce is related to the security 
measure of delivering Major Enterprises stock to the court for 
its disposal. Mr. O'Brien has exercised an option entitlement 
and is in fact acquiring Major stock consistent with the provi-
sions and terms of the stockholder agreement. 
In court I agreed to deliver this stock to the lower 
court, not fully taking into account the restrictive provisions 
of the stockholders agreement. I have made an effort to comply 
with this aspect of the judgment and tried to elucidate upon 
this through my attorney in oral argument but was not afforded 
the opportunity to discuss this matter because the Court disre-
garded the defendant's Major Enterprise stock offer and our 
acceptance of same, which again is also confusing to me in its 
incompleteness. 
The nconsentn judgment has not disposed of this matter, 
and again this is a matter that I tried to elaborate on to Judge 
Taylor, who preferred not to listen, I suppose in accordance 
with his responsibilities as a judge. But I nevertheless with-
drew my consent to comply with this aspect even as I will have to 
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do so at such time as I am requested to make delivery. It was 
not in my power then when I stipulated to do so, and I don't 
believe it is in my power now to comply. Does the present Court 
affirmation effectively dispense with this delivery of stock 
issue? Again, I tried to tell the lower court this when I 
withdrew my "consent" to the stipulation. Is this a proper 
and reasonable judgment conclusion? 
In summary at this point, let me make an effort to make 
sure that my points are understood: 
(1) I was asked to stipulate to the ownership 
of properties that I do not own at this time. These 
properties have been additionally included to arrive 
at $1,700,000 marital estate value, and they were 
not included in Faux's decree. 
(2) There are three points of law that the 
affirmation does not dispense with: 
(a) An illegal judgment against Holidair 
who was not a party to a divorce. 
(b) The unenforceability of the delivery 
of 14 apartments, 7 of which I don't own. 
(c) The illegality of the delivery of Major 
Enterprises Stock as a security measure. 
(Five) My one last and significant point is a point 
of marital estate evaluation and is distinct from the principle 
of additional inclusion of properties. When these two principles, 
inclusion and evaluation, are taken and worked together, it 
is possible to create an illusion of $1,700,000 marital estate 
-7-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
net worth. This is at the heart of the dilemma of my case 
and where I feel the most grossly misunderstood as I tried 
to explain to Judge Taylor and this Court. 
On pages 38 and 39 of the respondent's brief, the 
respondent's attorney states that Judge Taylor made an evaluation 
of Major Enterprises stock by the employment of the deadlock 
statute. Is this a legally permissible conclusion if there is 
no deadlock possibility? (See stockholder agreement contained 
in sealed brown envelope submitted by defendants counsel after 
the preparation of abstract of record.) To the detriment of my 
interest, this resulted in a $343,000 evaluation error. This 
error, if coupled with inclusion errors, became the means by which 
an additional $1,500,000 of artificial value was created on paper 
and accounts in substantial part for the difference of $225,000 
marital estate evaluation arrived at in the Faux decree. 
Departing from nprocedure for a moment, if I may, 
I would like to state that in my opinion that evaluation was 
too low and now, in hindsight, I can see that an adjustment should 
have been made but an apprisal evaluation of $1,700,000 is 
equally bad and the degree of its badness exceeds by far the 
badness of the Faux evaluation. The degree of that badness 
will likely keep spawning antagonisms into the future. This 
affirmation ruling has not addressed itself to that issue and 
accordingly does not effectively put this case to rest, even 
now. Can this court explain to me why this is a "proper" finding? 
I feel that in dividing up the ocean, I have been given 
the bottom half and that the $200,000 gesture referred to in the 
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last paragraph of the affirmation ruling, when taken into account 
with the inclusion of the Seegmiller piece of property is as 
fictitiously generous as it is fictitious in its origin. 
An answer to the question, Was Taylor entitled to make 
an evaluation of Major Enterprises stock on the basis of a 
deadlock statute if there in fact could be no !?corporate deadlock", 
would do a great deal to expose what has really gone on in the 
Taylor hearing. He never understood this distinction, even with 
"close proximity observation". Again, I tried to bring this 
to his attention as a legitimate basis of why I felt in good 
conscience I had to withdraw my stipulation. 
Gentlemen of the august Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah, if you do nothing else, please comment to this issue, as I 
have grown unusually.weary from asking this highly germane ques-
tion. The affirmation ruling, it seems to me, has missed this 
"deadlock statute" dimension entirely, and I believe it to be 
a significant point of law. 
Esteemed and honorable gentlemen of the Court, if the 
December 16, 1975 affirmative ruling in its first two pages 
establishes a "tone" or, if you will, a "slant" that Judge Faux 
had the insight to provide a kind of protective device in his 
decree, in those two pages it is assumed from the beginning 
that the protection somehow was there for the exclusive benefit 
of the defendant. 
Perhaps he meant that interpretation be employed. 
Again, I am not sure, I am just confused. I know he said this, 
and I see no reference to it in the ruling, and it may be 
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deserving of some comment. 
In the Memorandum Decision, preliminary to the prepara-
tion of the Findings of Fact of the final Faux decree, on page 
27,, the following comment by Judge Faux appears: 
I have had difficulty settling upon defendant's 
proposal of dividing the various properties between 
the parties as the safe and equitable means of dis-
posing of the economic problems involved. Frequently 
such a division is a satisfactory plan. I am now 
convinced that division of the interest in the cor-
porate entities will result in destruction of the 
whole complex which has had unusual growth, to a large 
extent, because of plaintiff's business courage, fore-
sight and decisiveness. I prefer to adopt a plan 
more promising of continued growth. 
Again, on page 43 of the Abstract of Record in Judge 
FauxTs "Findings" and "Conclusions", he stated: 
4. That Plaintiff is awarded as his sole and 
separate property all other properties of whatsoever 
nature not awarded defendant in the foregoing paragraph. 
which as I read and understand gave me the right to purchase the 
Seegmiller property. 
This affirmative ruling, it seems to me, has the effect 
of the exact opposite of the implied intent of the now retired 
Judge and to suggest otherwise is again difficult for me to 
comprehend. 
One last question, gentlemen: if this "affirmation" 
and "judgment" accomplishes what it purports to do, namely to 
grant to the plaintiff a "larger share", that he should have no 
reason to complain, let the author of this affirmative ruling 
ask the defendant's counsel to demonstrate once and for all, 
orally or in writing, where rebuttle is possible, one item, 
including even my $24,000 annual salary, that the present decree 
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at the time of its issuance, December 16, 1975, grants to the 
plaintiff that doesnft have at least one of the following ele-
ments : 
CI) The value is other than what has been 
represented. 
C2) That it has been paid for with funds developed 
after the marriage, 
(3) That it is so encumbered that as a practical 
matter it is not functionable in the practice of the 
plaintiff's trade. 
(4) Or that it in fact does not even exist at 
all. 
(5) Or that does not have the strong likelihood 
of being lost by reason of foreclosure or withering 
away because of excessively high interest rates — this 
contrasted to the reverse being the case in what the 
defendant has been granted. 
In conclusion, most esteemed gentlemen, please accept 
my humble inquiries as prompted by an effort on my part to 
accept emotionally and psychologically the imponderables that this 
affirmation ruling imposes. This decision seems to have the effect 
of not granting me a divorce from the nature of the things that 
I was trying to separate myself from, namely the continuing 
assertion of power and influence over my life that I concluded 
four and one-half years ago was unbearable and undeserved. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Rnhp-rt n Y~i ^A 
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